We investigate the impact of the US drone program in Pakistan on insurgent violence. Using novel details about US-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation and geocoded violence data, we show that the program was associated with monthly reductions of around 9-13 insurgent attacks and 51-86 casualties in the area affected by the program. This change was sizable as in the year before the program the affected area experienced around 21 attacks and 100 casualties per month. Additional quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that this drop is attributable to the drone program. However, the damage caused in strikes during the program cannot fully account for the reduction. Instead, anticipatory effects induced by the drone program played a prominent role in subduing violence. These effects stemmed from the insurgents' perception of the risk of being targeted in drone strikes; their efforts to avoid targeting severely compromised their movement and communication abilities, in addition to eroding within-group trust. These findings contrast with prominent perspectives on air-power, counterinsurgency, and US counterterrorism, suggesting select drone deployments can be an effective tool of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
Pakistan, we compare the evolution of insurgent violence before and after the launch of the US drone program inside North Waziristan to that elsewhere in FATA. We find that the program corresponds with a reduction in violence on the order of 9 to 13 insurgent attacks per month and 51 to 86 casualties per month. If this change is attributable to the program, it suggests a sizable effect; in the year before implementation, the region experienced 21 attacks and resultant 100 casualties in an average month. We clarify the assumptions under which our data are consistent with a negative causal impact of the program on insurgent violence and evaluate their plausibility in light of both qualitative and quantitative evidence.
Our key contribution is investigating the impact of the drone program holistically whereas previous empirical work on air-power and drones has focused on the effect of individual strikes. For example, Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) show that drone strikes in Pakistan were correlated with short-run reductions in violence. We provide suggestive evidence that this approach may substantially underestimate the impact of US counterterrorism in Pakistan: Only about 25% of the negative association between the drone program and insurgent violence which we document can be explained by the aggregated effects of individual strikes. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical finding in the literature suggestive of an important role of capabilities like surveillance that enable strikes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.
We explain our findings as resulting from insurgent degradation under the drone program. The security studies literature largely focuses on the killing of leaders and rank-and-file to explain consequences of targeting-which we call kinetic effects. Although such kinetic effects are clearly important to diminishing targeted groups, we argue that our empirical findings are best understood as the result of both kinetic and anticipatory effects. Targeting programs which leverage large-scale surveillance and rapid exploitation of intelligence-as the program in Pakistan did-can substantially increase insurgents' perception of the risk associated with activities they believe might precipitate strikes. The resulting changes in insurgent behavior to avoid targeting constitute anticipatory effects. They include three major changes in insurgent life: restricted movement, constrained communication, and compromised intra-group trust. We contend that these changes prevented formidable armed groups like Al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban from meaningfully adapting to the drone program. Novel qualitative evidence, including some testimonies of members of Al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban, support this view.
Theoretical Perspectives
We conceptualize a drone program as a campaign which seeks to identify and swiftly target insurgents using sustained aerial surveillance, advanced communication interception, intelligence analysts, and devolved targeting authority. Such a program can plausibly shape an important feature of insurgent politics:
violence. Below, we synthesize and extend existing theoretical work to predict the effect of a program on insurgent violence.
Drone Program as an Antagonist to Violence
We locate the drone program's ability to undermine an insurgency in its particular tactical, technological, and organizational capabilities. 2 Consider the US government's ideal drone deployment. Such deployments utilize intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) drones-often combined with precise weapons delivery platforms-to monitor the civilian population and generate leads on the insurgency (Flynn, Juergens, and Cantrell 2008; Task Force 2013) . In addition, communication interception is an important complement to such platforms. The US government uses a variety of technical tools to identify the location of communication devices, and determine the content being communicated between them (Arkin 2015) . One such technology is Gilgamesh -which "is attached to unmanned Predator and even larger Reaper drones, where it performs a very specific task in "signals intelligence," seeking out the faintest and most fleeting of buried digits emanating from the contemporary netherworld" (Arkin 2015) .
This type of technological surveillance is often combined with human intelligence derived from interrogations of insurgents, networks of paid spies, and informants available to local partners (McChrystal 2013, 199) .
The US government's select drone deployments are able to exploit leads from surveillance sources to generate actionable information, and quickly act upon that information. They achieve this by drawing on plentiful analysis and collation paraphernalia to follow up on leads (Lin-Greenberg 2018) . Select deployments are also empowered to undertake targeting by extensive legal and political authority and rapidly deployable striking platforms. If engaged in surveillance, platforms like the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper can be readily re-purposed for precise targeting (Task Force 2013, 12-16) .
We claim the combined effect of these capabilities can reduce insurgent violence through two mech-2. Not all drone deployments are accompanied by such capabilities. See Task Force (2013, (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) anisms: kinetic effects and anticipatory effects. 3 Kinetic effects consist of damage to insurgent organizations directly caused by drone strikes such as leadership decapitation, rank-and-file attrition, lost capabilities, and casualties of civilian supporters. Such effects have been extensively examined in studies of air-power, counterinsurgency, and leadership decapitation (Pape 1996; Jordan 2009; Johnston 2012; Price 2012; Long 2014; Johnston and Sarbahi 2016) . A drone program which swiftly exploits intelligence generated by surveillance is likely to generate extensive kinetic effects, which can reduce insurgent violence.
In addition to kinetic effects, anticipatory effects undermine insurgency violence by inducing changes to their perception of the risk of being targeted rather than by physical damage in strikes. This mechanism has received less attention in debates on air-power, counterinsurgency, and drones. Scholars of populationcentric counterinsurgency focus more on variation in civilian support and less on sources of insurgent organizational fragmentation (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Berman and Matanock 2015; Shaver and Shapiro, Forthcoming) . Within existing work on drones, Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) and Byman (2013) discuss ideas pertaining to anticipatory effects. Johnston and Sarbahi (2016, 206) , for example, argue that ". . . drone strikes in an area represent a meaningful indication of an increased security risk to militants." However, they do not elaborate on how such a mechanism might undermine an insurgency.
Under a drone deployment with the surveillance and targeting capabilities described above, we believe insurgents are likely to anticipate being targeted and adjust their behavior accordingly. Although any campaign by state forces might produce such effects, a drone program's sustained surveillance and swiftly executed strikes may produce especially high levels of perceived risk of targeting. Insurgents may feel compelled to significantly adjust their organizational practices to mitigate the threat posed by a drone program, inducing changes in the way they move, communicate, and interact within their group in a bid to avoid targeting. If insurgents feel that their movements may produce detectable patterns that precipitate strikes they may reduce activities such as patrolling, picketing, or organizing sabotage in the open in a bid to avoid detection. Communication involving radios or mobile and satellite phones may prove difficult to maintain once insurgents come to realize that interception of communication devices
can provide cues about their locations. Intra-group trust may break down altogether; leaders and rankand-file may exercise increased caution in all interactions-even within their own ranks-due to concerns of infiltration.
Our first hypotheses are motivated by both the kinetic and anticipatory mechanisms: 3. For a theoretical discussion of the sources of such effects, see: Mir (2018) Hypothesis 1a All else being equal, violence decreases during the operation of the drone program Hypothesis 1b All else being equal, individual drone strikes will be followed by a reduction in violence Hypothesis 1b follows from our discussion of the kinetic effects of the drone program. We expect most individual drone strikes to inflict some form of kinetic damage on insurgent organizations, thereby having the potential to reduce violence. As this hypothesis has been examined in the literature , we primarily focus on hypothesis 1a which can be motivated by both mechanisms (Johnston and Sarbahi 2016; Abrahms and Potter 2015) . Regarding kinetic effects, note that if individual strikes reduce violence in the short-run a program involving the repeated execution of strikes will reduce violence for at least as long as it is active. Furthermore, some individual strikes may produce kinetic damage that persists well into the future. In addition, the anticipatory effects mechanism may separately undermine violence once insurgents become aware of heightened surveillance and its efficacy in targeting. It may also amplify damage due to the kinetic effects and limit insurgents' ability to recover from such damage.
Drone Program as a Catalyst for Violence
There are potential countervailing forces which may offset the kinetic and anticipatory effects of a drone program. For example, groups may find ways to adapt to the existence of the program. This suggests the following alternative hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a All else being equal, violence does not change during the operation of the drone program Hypothesis 2b All else being equal, violence decreases during the early stages of the drone program but reverts (partially or completely) towards pre-program levels in the long-run Prospects of successful adaptation may depend on a targeted group's intrinsic type. An important literature on civil war posits that outcomes of targeting insurgent groups are conditioned by the group's characteristics. Scholars argue that some armed groups possess attributes like social bases, quality recruits, institutionalization, networks, and prior experiences of selective violence that make them both resilient and dynamic (Weinstein 2006; Staniland 2014; Long 2014; Jordan 2014; Finkel 2015; Toft and Zhukov 2015) . We might expect such groups to quickly recover when harmed and overtime learn how to operate effectively despite the program.
Another countervailing force stems from civilian behavior. The literature on counterinsurgency and civil war suggests that civilian behavior is of strategic importance in wartime (Kalyvas 2006; Berman and Matanock 2015) . This literature views civilians as central conduits of information in irregular warfare, affording the side they collaborate with an informational advantage and in turn an advantage in undertaking violence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011) . Some scholars argue that attaining civilian cooperation is a function of levels of security, service provision, and collateral damage (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011) . If the drone program harms the civilian population-as many analytical accounts of US drone deployments suggest-we might expect it to increase civilian support in favor of the insurgency. In turn, this may diminish the effectiveness of the program. This provides another motivation for hypotheses 2a and 2b. 4 Civilians might also join combat in response to victimization by political actors (Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Goodwin 2001; Wood 2003) . Wood (2003, 235) provides an influential elaboration of this logic, arguing that victimized civilians may join the insurgency as a way to express their agency. An important body of scholarly work, press accounts, and human rights reports suggest that drones increase sympathy for insurgents by triggering sentiments of revenge in the civilian population (Clinic and NYU School of Law 2012; Lamb, Woods, and Yusufzai 2012; International 2013; Boyle 2013; Cronin 2013) . 5 This mechanism provides further support for hypotheses 2a and 2b, as well as an additional hypothesis: (2016) 5. Tahir (2015) makes a powerful argument that practice and criteria of drone strikes is akin to colonial collective punishment practices. Shah (2018) challenges the view that drone strikes increase radicalization at the local level. and Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller (2015) suggest that to the extent antiAmericanism exists in Pakistan it is not due to drone strikes alone. The figure shows an upwards trend throughout FATA in the period prior to the program's initiation.
After January 2008, this growth continued in the areas unaffected by the program-if perhaps at a somewhat slower rate-but appears to have stopped or even reversed in North Waziristan. This pattern is the primary empirical finding of this paper. If one attributes this break in trend to the programassuming that, in its absence, violence in North Wazirstan would have followed a trend similar to that in the rest of FATA-it follows that the program had a large negative impact on violence in that region.
We consider several approaches to quantifying the correlation described above. We also discuss the assumptions under which the estimated correlations are consistent with a causal effect, assessing their plausibility in light of available quantitative and qualitative evidence. Ultimately, we conclude there is substantial support for the hypothesis that the US drone program in Pakistan had a negative impact on insurgent violence.
Study Area and Period
Our study examines the period from January 2003 
Data
Our dependent variables are derived from a dataset compiled by the BFRS project containing information on reported incidents of political violence occurring within the FATA between January 2002 to November 2011 (Mesquita et al. 2014, 8) . 18 We geocode these incidents in order to construct tehsil-month level measures of insurgent attacks and resultant casualties. 19 We exclude all incidents unlikely to be related to insurgent violence: drone strikes and attacks perpetrated by Pakistani security forces, any foreign security forces, student groups, religious parties, unions, civil society groups, political parties or Pakistani 17. In unreported results, we verified that our findings are robust to including this region. Employing tehsil-month-level observations in our regression analyses permits examining spatial variation in violence at a finer level than previous empirical studies of violence in Pakistan. These were constrained to district-level analysis. However, it is important to note that the drone program appears to have been assigned at the level of district, not tehsil. Thus, the primary advantage of our tehsil-level analysis is that it permits the use of tehsil-specific control variables. 21 Table 1 displays instructive descriptive statistics on the period before the drone program commenced. 22 There were meaningful similarities but also important differences between tehsils subjected to the drone program and those which were not. This might be explained in part by the non-random assignment of the drone program but even with random assignment at the district level, large differences would not be anomalous in such a small sample of districts. 23 20. For details, see supplement. 21. Conceivably, it might yield improved statistical inference but, as we discuss later, this is in doubt. 22. The supplement discusses data sources. 23. We discuss this issue further in 4.1.1. 
Regression-based Results
In this section, we use standard panel methods to estimate the magnitude of the correlation between the drone program and levels of violence. All our regression specifications conform to the following structure:
where Y it is the outcome variable. treat t is a variable indicating whether time period t (a month) occurs in 2008 or later. nwa i is a binary variable indicating whether tehsil i is in North Waziristan Agency.
Our base specification includes this interaction term along with vectors of tehsil fixed effects (α i ) and month-year fixed effects (θ t ), which account for differences in levels of violence which are tehsil-specific but time-invariant and vice versa. Other specifications also include tehsil-specific linear time trends (τ i ) and additional control variables (X it ).
It seems likely the error terms in this specification will exhibit serial correlation, raising concerns of downwardly biased standard errors and consequent over-rejection of the true null hypotheses (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) . To address this we present standard errors clustered by tehsil. We also employ the wild bootstrap approach proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) , which may be more reliable given our small number of clusters (32). 24 Ultimately, both strategies are imperfect, for reasons discussed in the supplement. Tables 2 and 3 formal evidence of a departure from parallel trends in the pre-treatment period cautioning against a straightforward causal interpretation of our estimates.
Column 2 displays an estimate from a specification which adds tehsil-specific linear time trends. This is a common technique for addressing concerns about non-parallel trends which alters the assumptions needed for causal interpretation of estimates of δ, instead requiring parallel trends in deviations from the time trends. 26 This specification yields negative estimates of δ larger in magnitude than the base specification.
Next, we consider the impact of adding additional control variables. Particularly relevant controls are those pertaining to peace deals and military operations. P eace it and M O it are tehsil-month-level 26. See Mora and Reggio (2017) for a more precise characterization.
variables indicating whether-within tehsil i during month t-any peace deal was active or sizable de- The third and fourth columns of the tables report coefficient estimates from specifications that include these control variables in addition to linear time trends. They differ in that the former uses just the two indicator variables described above to control for military operations and peace deals while the latter includes interactions between these and tehsil indicators permitting tehsil-specific influences by these factors. The resulting estimates are quite similar to those from the time trend specification.
The inclusion of most of these controls can be motivated by the possibility that the weakened parallel trends assumption needed for a causal interpretation of the linear time trend specification-discussed above-is satisfied after conditioning on these variables. The ObamaReview it variable, by contrast, is motivated by concern that the changes in violence that accompanied the heightened NATO supply line activity are not informative about the counterfactual path of violence in North Waziristan and should not be ignored when estimating the drone program's impact.
However, we want to emphasize that peace deals and military activity are likely endogenous to the introduction of the program, which may have substituted for Pakistani state activity of this kind.
27. See supplement for coding protocol. 28. Woodward (2011) provides a detailed discussion of the "Af-Pak" review. 
Alternative Interpretations
Here, we discuss two alternatives to a causal interpretation of the regression-based results reported until now.
Mean Reversion
One concern is that our results may simply reflect mean reversion following anomalous spikes in violence In light of this evidence, we contend that the complex political process, which shaped the location of the flight box and in turn the drone program, was largely exogenous to insurgent violence in the FATA.
However, in our context, this is not enough to ensure the parallel trends assumption holds. 
Displacement
Another concern is that the drone program might have induced insurgent leadership and manpower to move to areas outside the flight box, leading to displacement of violence to other parts of FATA. This would undermine a strictly causal interpretation of our findings.
If there were displacement effects, we would expect them to be strongest in Orakzai and Kurram, the districts closest to North Waziristan Agency. As such, the post-treatment increase in violence that is observed in these districts should assuage this concern to some degree.
We compliment this informal analysis with empirical robustness checks. We re-run the regressions discussed in the previous section on five restricted samples, each containing only one of our control districts: Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, and Orakzai. 32 Figures 6 graphically present the resulting point estimates of δ and accompanying confidence intervals. 33 The estimates are broadly similar to those based on our full sample, though not always as statistically significant. We interpret the similarity of coefficient estimates as evidence that our findings are not driven by spillover effects. 
Event Study
Here, we use an event study to more explicitly track the differential trends in violence that underly the correlation between the drone program and violence. This method offers one way to formally test for a departure from parallel trends in the pre-program period and a lens through which to discuss causal inference in the absence of a parallel trends assumption. 35 Let H(t) be a function which maps a given month t from our study period into the half-year containing it. A half-year is the either the first or last six months of a given year; for example, January-June 2002. Further, suppose we label each half-year sequentially with an integer such that the final half-year before the drone program was implemented (July-December 2007) is labeled zero. 36
Then our event-study specification can be written:
where i denotes tehsil and t denotes month.
This equation is similar to (1) Post-2008 event study coefficients (j > 0) are also all negative, larger in magnitude than any of hoc-was motivated by a desire to increase statistical power in the hopes of more reliably detecting instances where these coefficients are non-zero. Alternative constructions yield qualitatively similar results, with estimates tending (unsurprisingly) to grow noisier and confidence intervals wider as temporal granularity of the interaction terms increases. 38. As noted previously, the requisite parallel trends assumption is different for results from our other specifications, so this test does not directly speak to their merits. 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
It should be noted that the departure from parallel trends documented above might not have been obvious when looking at figure 6. 48 In these graphs, the pre-2008 patterns of violence in and outside North
Waziristan appear much more similar. This difference results from a change in the unit of analysis. The dependent variables in that figure are monthly totals of attacks and casualties inside and outside North
Waziristan whereas the dependent variables in our regressions are instead tehsil-level totals. Because our sample contains the 9 tehsils inside North Waziristan and 23 outside the flight box, even if the parallel trends assumption were satisfied when comparing total violence in the control and treatment areas, it
would not (in general) be satisfied when comparing average violence per tehsil between those areas. It is this latter parallel trends assumption that is needed for causal interpretation of estimates from our base specification.
This makes it clear that our application suffers from a variant of the modifiable areal unit problem. 49
The scale of our dependent variables is not invariant to changes in our choice of a spatial unit of aggregation. Consequently, the particular parallel trends assumption needed for causal interpretation of our panel regressions varies with this choice. 50 We can see no obvious reason to prefer any particular level of spatial aggregation over another a priori.
That said, the parallel trends assumption underlying a causal interpretation of our panel regressions is more conservative than that which would accompany an analysis based on aggregation of our data into two spatial units: inside and outside North Waziristan Agency. Since there are relatively more tehsils outside the flight box, our analysis implicitly lessened the magnitude of the post-program increase in violence in those areas, thus also lessening the implied counterfactual increase in violence in North
Waziristan. Nonetheless, our choice of tehsil-level aggregation remains arbitrary.
48. We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this discrepancy. 49. See Fotheringham and Wong (1991) for a discussion. 50. This problem is not unique to our paper, but affects any other difference-in-differences design using spatially aggregated count variables.
In this section, we probe the mechanisms mediating the negative association between the US drone program and insurgent violence documented above in two steps. First, we examine whether it can be explained by simply aggregating the local effects of individual drone strikes undertaken as part of the drone program. Next, we consider limited but valuable qualitative evidence pertinent to the program's anticipatory effects. This work is far from definitive but demonstrates the plausibility of both the kinetic and anticipatory mechanisms.
Decomposing Results
Our methodological approach in the preceding sections differs substantially from that employed in previous work on effects of drones. Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) -also investigating the US drone program in Pakistan-documented a negative correlation between drone strikes and insurgent violence occurring in the same district-week observation. As we have noted, the program's total effect need not be composed of simply the aggregation of short-run responses to individual strikes, especially if the surveillance dimension of the program led to anticipatory effects. In this section, we probe how much of the program-level correlation we document might be accounted for by the impact of individual drone strikes documented in the previous literature. Table 4 presents the results. Columns (1) and (4) contain estimates from our base specification for incidents and casualties dependent variables respectively (for reference purposes). 51 In columns (2) and (5), we present results for a regression with month-year and tehsil fixed effects and a variable measuring the number of drone strikes occurring within a given month in the district a tehsil is located in. To be clear, although our observations are at the tehsil-month level, district-month level drone strike coding allows the effect of strikes to reach across an entire district. This specification is the most similar to what has been done in the previous literature. 52 These estimates document a statistically significant negative correlation between drone strikes and insurgent violence in a given month in the area in which the strikes occurred, consistent with Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) .
Columns (3) and (6) display results from our baseline specification with the drone strikes variable 51. These estimates were previously presented in tables 2 and 3. 52. Our coding of drone strike variable is similar to that of Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) who code their drone strikes variable at the district-week level. added as a regressor. The estimates contain several interesting results. First, notice that the estimated coefficient on treat · nwa decreases in size significantly relative to the baseline specification for both incidents and casualties dependent variables. This suggests that the short-run effect of drone strikes may account for a portion of the total program impact. However, the estimates on treat · nwa are about 75%
of their original size in both cases, suggesting that-as measured by a district-month-level variable-the immediate effects of drone strikes do not account for most of the correlation we have detected. This suggests that most of the correlation we have detected between the onset of the drone program and insurgent violence cannot be explained as simply the aggregation of the impact of many individual drone strikes-at least, not when measured by a district-month-level variable.
Comparing columns (3) and (6) to columns (2) and (4) also shows that introducing the treat · nwa variable almost halves the magnitude of the correlation between drone strikes and insurgent violence.
This indicates that the correlations presented in columns (2) and (4) What best explains the isolated out effect of individual strikes and the sizable residual effect of the drone program? The isolated effect of strikes is plausibly best explained by kinetic effects; that is, the targeted groups experienced damage in the form of leadership decapitation and loss of personnel, which set back the operational capability of the group. This is consistent with the interpretation provided by Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) . However, the explanation for the residual effect is less clear. There are three possibilities: pure kinetic effects; pure anticipatory effects; and a combination of kinetic and anticipatory effects. We believe kinetic effects alone cannot plausibly explain the residual effect. A kinetic effects-based explanation would suggest that drone strikes did lasting damage to the capabilities of the targeted groups, which extended far beyond the month of the strike. This is not likely because Al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban-the two main targets of the program-were relatively capable organizations, able to recover from losses under ordinary circumstances (Jordan 2014; Staniland 2014; Long 2014; Toft and Zhukov 2015) . A more plausible account is one where kinetic effects interacted with anticipatory effects in first damaging and then constraining the recovery of these groups. A pure anticipatory effects story could also account for the residual association between the drone program and violence. Such an account would suggest that groups stayed continuously disorganized because of the sustained surveillance which induced high levels of perceived risk among insurgents.
Qualitative Evidence on Mechanisms
Here we draw on qualitative evidence to argue the importance of the mechanism of anticipatory effects of the drone program. An important caveat is that we do not claim the anticipatory effects mechanisms is the dominant driver of the drop in insurgent violence. Our purpose is to highlight its significance, given that it remains an understated mechanism. We draw on two sources of evidence: Interviews conducted in 
Implications and Conclusion
This study explains and empirically demonstrates how a drone program can shape one key dimension of internal conflict: insurgent violence. Our work has implications for a number of scholarly and policy debates. We add to the debate on how transformative drones are for international relations (Stulberg 2007; Zenko 2013; Boyle 2015; Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016; Zegart 2018) . Existing scholarship provides valuable but limited conceptualization of the capabilities drones bring to the table, and how they are shaping the modern battlefield (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016) . We contribute to this debate with extensive evidence on one type of deployment in asymmetric conflict: the combination of armed aerial drones with a pervasive surveillance regime, an extensive intelligence analysis bureaucracy, and broad targeting authority. Furthermore, our findings suggest that similarly well-resourced drone deployments may prove useful to states fighting insurgent organizations in other theaters.
Our findings also speak to empirical debates on the effects of drones. We complicate Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) who show that an average drone strike in Pakistan's tribal areas was associated with a short-run reduction in proximate violence. We show that, viewed in isolation, their findings underestimate the impact of US counterterrorism on insurgent violence in Pakistan. Our work also speaks directly to the view that drone strikes fuel insurgencies in the areas where they are carried out (Kilcullen and Exum 2009; Mazzetti and Shane 2013; Boyle 2013) . If the strength of the Pakistani insurgency can be proxied by measured violence, we find evidence that the US drone program weakened it in the North Waziristan Agency.
Our findings contrast with the scholarly view that use of air-power against insurgents tends to be counterproductive (Pape 1996; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; Dell and Querubin 2017) . Relatedly, our study has implications for the population-centric model of counterinsurgency. This view argues that winning over civilians-through security and/or service provision-is critical for state forces to gain intelligence. 63 Our work implies that if states can build robust surveillance infrastructures, they can minimize the value of civilian collaboration to intelligence gathering.
Our analysis is highly policy-relevant. It speaks to a common view among counterterrorism operators about the importance of sustained aerial surveillance (Task Force 2013, 12-16) . Our analysis provides some support for this intuition though we were unable to test it rigorously. Our findings also highlight the importance of local partner capacity and cooperation in enabling effective counterterrorism campaigns.
The negotiation process between the US and Pakistani governments at the onset of the program shows that Pakistani capacity and cooperation was a key ingredient for realizing the capabilities of the program.
Finally, we provide a basis to speculate on the popularly held notion that "drones create more terrorists" (Abbas 2013) . Our evidence suggests two possibilities: either the drone program did not facilitate insurgent recruitment (by inciting feelings of revenge or sympathy), or insofar as it did, insurgent groups struggled to integrate these new recruits into their organizations. Our focus on anticipatory effects speaks primarily to the latter possibility. The crisis of in-group trust may have imposed constraints on the extent to which insurgents could benefit from the availability of recruits.
That said, caution is warranted regarding the external validity of our results. While we contribute new information on the secret counterterrorism pact between the US and Pakistani governments, much remains unknown about the composition of US-Pakistan intelligence sharing and US surveillance technologies central to the program. Such details are critical when considering the generalization of our results, especially for weak state contexts like Afghanistan and Yemen.
Finally, while our theoretical position attributes relatively less importance to civilian behaviors and preferences in shaping conflict processes, we do not condone harm to civilians by drone strikes. Our evidence and theoretical perspectives on program efficacy alone cannot justify the use of drones. We remain extremely concerned on the reported levels of civilian casualties in US drone campaigns including 63. See Nagl et al. (2008) , Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011 ), Condra and Shapiro (2012 ), Berman and Matanock (2015 , and Shaver and Shapiro (Forthcoming) on the importance of civilian collaboration for counterinsurgency.
the one in Pakistan. Our finding that strategic gains are possible even when civilians are harmed should be a call for an even greater focus on civilian protection. In the absence of functional incentives to protect civilians, we worry that states may be prone to civilian abuse.
